Industry-Specific Reforms > Provision of Industrial Land

  • The lack of objectivity and transparency in the allocation and pricing of land, as well as the absence of comprehensive information on the availability of land, prices, and acquisition procedures.
  • Land policies are developed in the absence of an updated integrated land information system.
  • Lack of standardized procedures for land allocation across the various government entities, and lengthy and cumbersome allocation procedures.  

Industry-Specific Reforms > Provision of Industrial Land

  • IDA lacks the financial resources needed for equipping industrial land with utilities. Together with the high cost of bringing utilities to undeveloped plots, small investors face a shortage of appropriate industrial land. IDA’s lack of financial resources is likely to hinder its ability to deliver on its plan of making available 60 million square meters of land by 2020.
  • Lack of industrial land plots (500 square meters) available to small enterprises in industrial zones, in line with the Industrial Licensing Law.
  • Excessive increases in land prices and the lack of pricing standards.

Industry-Specific Reforms > Provision of Industrial Land

  • Land registration requires conducting cadastral surveys. However, the current capacity of the Egyptian Survey Authority does not allow it to respond to survey requests nation-wide in a timely manner, thus, expedited requests for registration are put on hold. 

Industry-Specific Reforms > Provision of Industrial Land

Failure to fully enforce some of the provisions of Law No. 15 of 2017

  • The New Urban Communities Authority, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Housing, Utilities, and Urban Communities, continues to require investors to provide a bank guarantee to acquire land in industrial zones; this is an exaggerated requirement as it was revoked under Law No. 15 of 2017.

Industry-Specific Reforms > Provision of Industrial Land

Even though the Prime Minister’s decision number 3308 for year 2022 with regard to the immediate allotment of the industrial lands of the investors in applying the principle of usufruct, the decision included some important points that require modification:

  • The decision of the H.E Prime Minister no. 3308 for year 2022 with regard to the industrial land in most of the decreed rulings, especially concerning the rules and established prices, have been already issued from the Industrial Development Authority and the responsible commission with the decision no. 2100 for year 2021.
  • There was no discussion held with the Federation of Egyptian Industries (FEI) about the prices of the lands included in the decree which are overpriced and not attracting any investment/investors.
  • The decision did not include the required documents, even though the FEI had its reservations and objected several times about the documents required from the industrial investors after formulating committee 2100 for year 2021 such as providing detailed feasibility studies that include a technical,  economic, and fiscal studies. Also, infrastructure studies, capital investment, proposed fund, schedule of outdated products, production cost list, and a 5-year prospective income list starting from the project’s initiation date. Furthermore, referencing the procedures and pricing for the established committee according to the PM’s decision no. 2100 for year 2021, in contrast to what the decree no.95 for 2018 included.
  • The decision did not include the timeframe/period installments shall be paid through.
  • The decision included that the proposed prices are for guidance.
  • The decision did not elaborate on what the investors should do in case the piece of land was not delivered and this is a common situation that happened with most investors.
  • In the first clause, chapter no.5 ‘’In case the investor does not pay for two consecutive installments, the ownership entity has the right to terminate the contract’’.
  • In the first clause, chapter no.6 ‘’The land is given to, including what is established/built on it, to its protectorate after the usufruct period is over’’
  • In all cases, that who is assigned shall comply with all the assignments’ requirements, which include implementing the project and starting the initiation process in three-years’ time maximum starting from the date of receiving the land, in addition to complying with the specified scheduled period of time, otherwise, the piece of land is withdrawn/taken with usufruct during the time of having the piece of land. These are the rules that are applied presently which have many disadvantages such as:
    • The contracts that are formulated with the investor are compliance contracts meaning that s/he do not have the right to object to any clause and it also includes what was mentioned in the abovementioned chapter no.6 according to the PM’s decision.
    • The existence of natural obstacles, in the lands being delivered, is not taken into consideration. Such as the existence of a hill or other obstacles which shall take a period of time from the investor to remove, in addition to the increasing burden of the construction costs. Also, the delay fines are doubled on a monthly basis and also standard costs
    •  The attached lands are not delivered with the specified given piece of land whether at the starting date of land receival or during the implementation/execution of the process. The owning entity does not comply with the aforementioned and delay fines are applied on the investor in case a delay takes place for the scheduled period.
    • The Industrial Development Authority sets the execution program for a time limit of three years, without taking into account any obstacles or impediments that impede the process.
  •  What was mentioned in the last paragraph of Article 3 of the PM’s decision which states ‘’Paying the price of the land after reevaluating its commercial price while deducting what has been paid as usufruct’’
     

Industry-Specific Reforms > Industrial Licensing Law

The limited capacity of IDA is reflected in a number of areas, including:

  • Inadequate staffing levels in IDA governorate-level offices render these offices ineffective.
  • Staff in the governorate-level offices do not have real authority to make decisions without consulting with headquarters in Cairo.
  • Some staff members are not well qualified; the majority do not have adequate understanding and knowledge of the procedures, and many lack the skills and abilities to engage effectively with the public.
  • IDA issued 16,000 licenses, however, it does not have the manpower to monitor and review these licenses. 
  • Poor communication and interaction between IDA and investors; the majority of investors are not aware of No. 15 of 2017.
  • IDA’s website requires further improvements and upgrading to serve as the prime platform for interaction with investors.

Industry-Specific Reforms > Industrial Licensing Law

  • Law No. 15 of 2017 is not fully implemented; contrary to Law No. 15 of 2017 that gave IDA a clear and comprehensive mandate over industrial activities, overlapping jurisdiction between IDA and other government entities persist.
  •  The multiplicity of oversight and inspection agencies, and the prevailing practice of imposing fines and shutting down enterprises by these agencies, including the Ministry Finance, the Ministry of Environment, the National Authority for Social Insurance, the Civil Defense Department, and local administration units.

Industry-Specific Reforms > Industrial Licensing Law

  • Industrial licensing procedures are rendered complex and difficult to identify and decipher by the endless paperwork and cumbersome bureaucracy.

Industry-Specific Reforms > Industrial Licensing Law

  • The license processing time continues to be long; banks refuse to finance industrial activities before the issuance of the operating license and the start of operations. 
  • The limited availability or lack of accreditation offices that are designed to speed up the licensing process.

Industry-Specific Reforms > Industrial Licensing Law

  • The service fees imposed by IDA are excessive and eat up the capital of the investors.

Industry-Specific Reforms > Industrial Licensing Law

Issues regarding the regulations of the Industrial Development Authority:

  • The procedures by which the ownership is transferred to the manufacturer after the full payment agreed upon. The factories still suffer from the fact that they cannot have an ownership document from the IDA.
  • There is no clarification in the clauses that highlights how a board of directors is to be selected.
  • Clause no.31 specified paying a 25% installment in case of land allocation and a period of four years for payment.
  • Clause No.38 specified the basis of comparison through using a points system in case the industrial investors requests are overloading. This is managed through the necessary estates to establish an industrial activity and in case the comparison of points between the applicants is insufficient then they may be selected based on the highest price offered by any of them.
  • Clause no.44 has specified the rules for the purpose for which the property was disposed of. It stipulated that it is not permissible to change the activity except after the approval of the IDA and all concerned authorities. It also requested that the investor shall pay at least 50% of the difference between the value of the obtained property and the market value on the date of submitting the application.
  • Clause No.34 has allowed the land-owning authorities to participate in the industrial projects in real states as an in-kind share within the capital of the project’s company in accordance with the conditions and regulations specified by the same article.

Responsible Entities

Date 9/15/2021

Industry-Specific Reforms > Utilities and Public Services

  • The procedures for extending utilities to industrial establishments are cumbersome, lengthy, and costly.
  • Industrial areas lack in services such as transport, health facilities, shops, and restaurants.
  • Pricing of different energy products for industrial establishments does not follow any uniform standard; pricing schemes vary according to the nature of the industrial sector.
  • The high price of natural gas has a negative impact on industrial competitiveness (particularly for steel factories); the domestic gas price reached $7/million British thermal unit compared to $3/million British thermal unit in the global market.

Industry-Specific Reforms > Import Control

  • IDA’s instructions regarding the registration of production inputs violate Article 15 of Ministerial Decree No. 835 of 2017, which amended some provisions of the Executive Regulations of the Import and Export Law, which were issued by Ministerial Decree No. 770 of  2005.

Industry-Specific Reforms > Import Control

  • While Ministerial Decree No. 43 of 2016, which amended the rules governing the registration qualified foreign manufacturers prior to exporting their products to Egypt, is aligned with international agreements and the World Trade Organization rules, yet, there are a number of issues with the implementation mechanisms of the decree. For example, Section 1 of Article 2 of the Decree mandates that factories interested in registering must provide, among other documentations, “….. A certificate confirming that the manufacturer has a quality control system, issued by a body recognized by the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) or the International Accreditation Forum (IAF), or by an Egyptian or foreign governmental entity approved by the minister responsible for foreign trade.”
  • Yet, to date, several companies that have been met the requirements set out in the decree remain unregistered, including a number of companies that adhere to high quality standards in their internal operations, and which enjoy a stellar international reputation.

Industry-Specific Reforms > Preference for Domestic Products

  • It was agreed with IDA’s former leaders to establish a comprehensive electronic system through which local product preference certifications would be issued to those interested in participating in government tendering processes; certification holders are to be accorded priority if their bids do not exceed the lowest foreign bid by more than 15%. Additionally, interested companies would also use the system to obtain the local component certificate required for receiving the export subsidy that the government offers as an incentive, based on meeting agreed upon terms and conditions. To date, this agreement has not been implemented.

Responsible Entities

Date 6/30/2020

Industry-Specific Reforms > Mineral Industry

  • Direct reduced iron (DRI) production plants (sponge iron) are not economically feasible due to the high price of natural gas ($7). In fact, DRI production plants should be treated like fertilizer and petrochemical plants, since natural gas is used as an input in the iron reduction process, and not as fuel. This gas pricing scheme has undeniable negative effects on the productive efficiency of the DRI production plants and impairs the equivalent of 6 million tons of sponge iron production capacity that can benefit the Egyptian economy. 

Industry-Specific Reforms > Mineral Industry

  • The fixed electricity charges (electric load charges) were supposed to represent less than 25% of the actual consumption. However, in the case of the metal casting industry (where the smelting is done within a day and the finishing within a week), as well as the factories which have to cease production for any reason, this fixed charge far exceeds the actual consumption cost.

Industry-Specific Reforms > Mineral Industry

  • New factories that have requested additional electrical power above 500 kilowatts are required to pay generation fees equivalent to LE 550/kilowatt for low voltage electricity, and up to LE 3000/ kilowatt for high voltage electricity. This is inconsistent with the manner older factories are treated, thus competition is tilted in favor of older factories. 

Industry-Specific Reforms > Mineral Industry

  • The practice of auctioning off heavy industry licenses works against the goal of expanding exports, which requires increasing production beyond the needs of the local market, and making good use of the industry’s comparative advantage (cost of fuel and gas is lower than in the countries that have to import). Needless to say, such a practice represents an additional burden on new factories, and unlevels the playing field for the competition between new factories and the already established ones.

Industry-Specific Reforms > Mineral Industry

  • While the mineral industry’s share in Egypt’s non-petroleum exports is more than 20%, yet the industry, small and big businesses, are denied any export support services, as well as the benefits of the duty drawback system. This is illustrative of the lack of clarity regarding the objectives of the export support program, and its meager benefits to the export industry (on the other hand, export support programs in other countries, such as China, Turkey and the United States, lends strength to their exports). 

Industry-Specific Reforms > Mineral Industry

  • Although the designation of industrial land plots for each industry in industrial zones is made with the full knowledge of IDA, yet industries are required to pay exorbitant fees, millions of Egyptian pounds, fees, if they want to raise the height of the building (more than 15 meters). Additionally, they have to obtain a building permit from the Civil Aviation Authority, which requires a topographic survey (costs thousands of Egyptian pounds per factory). 

Industry-Specific Reforms > Ceramics Industry

  • Factories suffer from high utility debt (electricity and natural gas) because they are erroneously classified as energy-intensive industries. 

Industry-Specific Reforms > Textile Industries

  • The Industrial Control Authority has weak capacities to carry out its functions, including the calculation of the waste percentages for manufacturers.